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From a SuppreSSed anti-CommuniSt 
diSSident movement to a GoverninG party: 
the tranSFormationS oF FideSZ in hunGary
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AbstrAct FIDESZ, as an outlawed protest movement of the Kádár era, has 
preserved their specific type of “outlawed and clandestine” political tradition 
and identity. A strong anti-communism, a popular mobilizing strategy and an 
atmosphere of hatred towards the agents of Hungary’s communist past remained 
within the political culture of the party from the suppressed underground 
movement. The political generation of leading activists, including current Prime 
Minister Viktor Orbán, has been socialized in the “underground” of the eighties. 
The experience of “being outlawed” under the Communist system has had long-
lasting effects on them. The “myths”, symbols, and “fights” of the suppressed 
protest movements keep themselves alive in the new political culture in the present 
goals and strategies of FIDESZ-MPP. The former protest movement transformed 
itself into a minority party with liberal affiliations in the new parliament of 1990. 
However, as the Hungarian Liberal Party (SZDSZ) moved into a governing 
alliance with the successor to the Communist party, FIDESZ moved to the right, 
becoming its leading force. Competition between five centre-right parties led to 
FIDESZ’s control as the leader of a centre-right government (1998-2002). While 
the socialists (MSZP) and liberals (SZDSZ) became governing forces twice (2002-
2010), FIDESZ became a mobilizing populist party, gaining hegemony within the 
parliamentary and extra-parliamentary opposition. The economic and financial 
crisis assisted FIDESZ in mobilizing protest, leading the FIDESZ-KDNP alliance 
to a two–thirds majority victory in the 2010 elections. 
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The general elections in Hungary in the spring of 2010 resulted in an 
overwhelming victory for the FIDESZ–MPSZ party (see tables 1-4). By 
taking more than two-thirds of all seats, it has an absolute majority and is 
able to define all political positions, as evidenced by the country’s changed 
constitution in April 2011. Where does FIDESZ come from (Bozóki, 1992)? 
It was formed from members of the Budapest “samizdat” scene in the 1980s 
and during the transition of the system became a political party in 1988 using 
its protest culture in different but efficient ways as a party of mobilization. 
My thesis is that the active protest roots of FIDESZ led the party to employ a 
mobilizing party strategy, while both serving in opposition and in a governing 
role. As a result, an influential mobilizing-populist party has emerged from the 
sub-cultural student movement (Bozóki, 1988) within the framework of party 
competition and party system development. We analyze this transformation, 
which has been in progress for more than twenty years, from a suppressed 
informal underground group to a governing party with huge voter support. 
In Hungary, based upon the law regarding associations and political 
parties from 1989 onwards, different organizational forms are provided for 
„challenging groups” as in every pluralist democracy (Körösényi et al., 2009). 
New characteristics of civic activism emerged within the pluralistic structural 
opportunities of the new political system after the Kádár era. Within the 
constitutional democracy, public mobilization and protest were transformed 
into legally and constitutionally regulated and accepted political institutions. 
Within the framework of the freedom of association and gathering, legal and 
public networking, resource mobilization and non-violent protests were born 
as widely accepted forms of political action. 
FIDESZ, as an outlawed protest movement of the Kádár era, preserved their 
specific type of “outlawed and clandestine” political tradition and identity. A 
strong anti-communist core, a popular mobilizing strategy and an atmosphere 
of hatred towards the agents of Hungary’s communist past remained within 
the political culture of the party from the suppressed underground movement. 
The political generation of leading activists, including current Prime Minister 
Viktor Orbán, has been socialized in the „underground” of the eighties. The 
experience of “being outlawed” in the Communist system has had long-lasting 
effects on them. The „myths”, symbols, and „fights” of the suppressed protest 
movements keep themselves alive in the new political culture with regard to 
the present goals and strategies of FIDESZ.
During the nineties, most of the leading personalities of FIDESZ, including 
the president and the board – the core decision makers – had had a ”record” 
of activism before 1989. Meanwhile, at the rank-and-file level, a wide 
range of supporters from every different political generation and grouping 
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– including former Communists – joined the group of supporters after 1989. 
The concentration of power and prerogatives in the hands of the former 
underground ”martyrs” in the leadership and the professional activity of 
the ”newcomers” characterized the division of labor within the party. After 
1989, a new generation of professional activists had become dominant, but 
at the level of the main leaders the goals and culture from the legacy of anti-
communism from the period before the regime change were preserved. This 
was accelerated by the development of FIDESZ as the leading and unifying 
force of the center-right, whose main enemy became the reformed Socialist 
Party. This sharp left-right division preserved the “culture of resistance” 
within FIDESZ against former communists and ensured that their heritage was 
framed by the FIDESZ leadership against their main enemy, the Hungarian 
Socialist Party (Körösényi et al., 2009). Although the different forms of civic 
protest did not lose their importance after 1989 within the new party, protest 
became only one of the forms of political activity. 
After 1989, public relations work, fundraising, national and international 
networking, professional education and the development of organization 
and management for professional campaigning and voter mobilization 
were of eminent importance among FIDESZ activists and professionally-
trained employees were required for producing efficient services. After 
1989, pragmatic and policy-issue-oriented approaches became the dominant 
approach. Six national and local elections and a period of government from 
1988 to 2002 transformed the former student protest group network into a 
professional center-right party, maintaining itself in the professionalized 
political-administrative system of representation and governance (Körösényi 
et al., 2009). These processes of bureaucratization and oligarchialization, 
as well as professionalization during the transformations of modern social 
movements into political parties were analyzed by Max Weber and Robert 
Michels (Zald 1990) at the beginning of the twentieth century. However, later 
social research made a distinction between the development of organizational 
structures, goals and programs and strategies development, challenging 
the Weber-Michels paradigm (Zald 1990). According to these findings, 
professional bureaucratic party organizations may preserve radical goals and 
a conflict-oriented culture from their pasts as social movements, which seems 
to be the case with the development of FIDESZ in Hungary.
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the three FaCeS oF FideSZ:  
diSSident movement, politiCal party,  
and mobiliZinG-populiSt party
In analyzing the political changes within FIDESZ, one has to differentiate 
between the political mobilization of the masses and the mobilization of social 
movements and organized political behavior within a political party.
We may differentiate the following stages within the development of 
FIDESZ: 
–  FIDESZ as a dissident movement between 1988 and 1990; 
–  As a party established in 1990, and a member of a growing multi-party 
system which rejected a mobilizing strategy in 1992; 
–  It’s role as the leading force of the centre-right from 1992-1998;
–  The stage of adoption of a top-down mobilization strategy by FIDESZ–
MPP in popular government campaigns between 1998 and 2002; 
–  FIDESZ–MPSZ after the 2002 elections as it became a mobilizing-
populist party of right-wing opposition, further accelerated by sharp non–
parliamentary conflicts starting with the 2006 Autumn riots; 
–  FIDESZ when it regained control of the government in 2010.
Hence, this 2002–2010 mobilization is different from the ones of 1988–
1992 because it is based on a nation-wide organizational network, as a 
former governing party (in terms of material and personal resources) with a 
new type of populist orientation and a civil society which can be addressed 
within the system of political pluralism (Ekiert-Kubik, 1998). In 1988–1992 
however, transition occurred within the social, economic, and political 
systems; there were uncertainties about the roles and differences between 
parties and movements, between the existence of a unified civil society 
supporting democratic transition beyond authoritarianism or a political party 
within a pluralistic spectrum (Ekiert, 1991). So, within the development of 
FIDESZ to FIDESZ-MPSZ we can see a change from a bottom up to a top 
down mobilization strategy, from a social movement to a party, from civil 
to political and from an NGO to a government organization. Based on these 
developments, the FIDESZ organization and strategy in 1988 played an 
avant-garde role in the change of system in Hungary, and later on followed 
the models of right-wing populist parties in Europe.
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FideSZ aS a diSSident movement
The protest tradition we had in Hungary before 1989 was one which 
consisted of younger, urban, professional, white-collar workers, especially 
students, artists, scientists, clerks, social workers, and educators; it was 
“dissent” and “opposition” natured. Protest was concentrated in the capital, 
in Budapest, and in some bigger university towns such as Pécs, Szeged, and 
Miskolc (Schöpflin, 1979). 
The share of youths in protests in Hungary was one of the highest among 
the Central European communist countries (Ramet, 1991). Younger people, 
especially students in higher education, are generally more likely to be 
mobilized in modern societies than established professionals with jobs and 
families. Younger people are more inclined to accept risky situations and have 
fewer boundaries and more free time and energy than workers and employees. 
Students were clearly dominant at protests in the eighties in Hungary, fighting for 
ecology, peace and human rights issues, although some of them were expelled 
from university, hindered in travelling abroad, or forced to enter military service, 
not to mention being subjected to other, ‘lighter’ forms of repression (Haraszti, 
1990; Miszlivetz, 1989). Youths and students who mobilized in 1989 took their 
reference points from the Hungarian revolutions of 1848 and 1956 when youth 
and students played a leading role (Tõkés, 1998).
The young, educated, mobile personalities and networks of the anti-
communist dissidents seemed similar to the supporters and the constituencies 
of the “new social movements” and Green parties of the eighties in Western 
Europe (Judt, 1988; Ramet, 1991). However, these western movements from 
the eighties were allies of left-libertarian parties, which were active in the 
peace, ecology, and autonomy movements, as well as in fighting peacefully 
for different social goals, from gay rights to squatting. Being critical of the 
market economy and bureaucracy were their common attributes. Meanwhile, 
autonomous social activism within the former Eastern Bloc countries rejected 
the planned economy and the bureaucratic–gerontocratic Communist structure 
(Szabó, 1991; Knabe, 1989). The eastern activists moved from alternative 
Marxism towards liberalism; the Western social movements from the New 
Left to alternative ecology and New Age. Eastern movements preferred 
the market economy and representative democracy; autonomous Western 
movements criticized consumer society and the crisis which stemmed from 
the adoption of western values and institutions. The goals and cultures of 
the social movements of the eighties were different in Eastern and Western 
Europe, though they shared some common points such as the focus on peace, 
ecology and human rights (Pollack-Wielghos, 2004). 
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FIDESZ was one of these radical anti-communist movements established 
within the crisis of the Eastern Bloc, bound to the western values of the 
market economy and human rights while opposing the legitimacy of the leftist 
ideology of the former communist regime. FIDESZ never had the trade-
unionist character that Poland’s Solidarnosc had (Arato, 1992; Ekiert –Kubik, 
1998), but it shared the value of national identity and self-determination against 
the forced communist internationalism of the Eastern Bloc. In Hungary, a 
special engagement with Hungarian language minorities (estimated at being 
between two to three million in number) was combined with rejection of 
Communist internationalism. As a result, nationalism, national minorities and 
self-determination shaped the political universe of FIDESZ, which was very 
different from the cosmopolitanism and global solidarity values of Western 
“new social movements” (Joppke, 1994). 
FIDESZ was established on the basis of the former autonomous student 
movement and organized protests against the communist system from 1988 
onwards. Of all the Hungarian political parties, they organized the most 
protests in the first legislative period of 1990–1994; primarily in the years 
between 1989 and 1992 (Ekiert –Kubik, 1998). Later on, the popular leader 
of the party, Viktor Orbán, launched a new strategy for gaining constituencies 
among all strata of the population. The party abandoned its former 35-year 
age limit for membership in 1992, gave up their intensive protest strategy 
and created a right-wing, pro-establishment reorientation with a focus on the 
public sector and high mobilization of youth and students (Mudde-Kopecky, 
2002-2003). The party lost its provocative, protest character, and groups that 
wanted to preserve their former identity were leaving or were pushed out by 
the centre-oriented mainstream by 1993.
FideSZ and proteStinG: a politiCal party 
SearChinG For itS own poSition and identity 
The protest activity of the parties of the first Hungarian parliament of 1990–
1994 was examined within the framework of an international comparative 
project on protest behavior (Ekiert–Kubik 1998). Of the parties in the first 
parliament, FIDESZ is ranked as being the most active in the politics of 
protest between 1989 and 1994 (Machos, 1993). However, if we look at 
the distribution of these protests, all the events took place in the first three 
years (1989-1991) of the period investigated. FIDESZ completely left the 
‘market’ for protest after that year. There was a change in party strategy and 
direction regarding social movements – especially the youth and alternative 
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movements – as they were pushed out of leading positions in the party. The 
activities of FIDESZ concentrated exclusively on parliamentary activity and 
they tried to escape their past as an anti-communist social movement through 
highly conformist political behaviour within the new institutions. FIDESZ 
ended its protest politics against the communists within the first years 
of democratization and did not participate in the campaigns of the liberal 
SZDSZ and the socialist MSZP against the MDF-led Christian-democratic 
government (Bozóki, 1999-2000). 
Originally, FIDESZ institutionalized a new political generation of Hungarian 
opposition: FIDESZ as a liberal party with a membership age limit of 35 in the 
eighties; while SZDSZ had the support of the older generation. FIDESZ was 
strongly affiliated with the Hungarian student, ecology and peace movement 
activists, whereas SZDSZ was based on the liberal groups of 1956 veterans and 
the traditions of Hungarian dissent, the “Budapest School”, the Georg Lukács-
circle and the civil rights opposition of the seventies and the later “samizdat” 
circles (Kende-Smolar, 1989). The different political traditions moved the two 
parties in different directions: SZDSZ remained more liberal-oriented while 
FIDESZ tried to be “pragmatic” and power-oriented, seeking alliances with 
nationalist parties. SZDSZ had and still has a strong tendency towards social 
liberalism, meanwhile FIDESZ merged the first patterns of liberal conservatism 
with alternative orientations (ecology, feminism, youth movements) and then 
with Hungarian nationalism and a Third Way orientation. The differences 
between the two parties were increasingly based on the different quality of 
political values and orientations of the political generations, and not their ages. 
In 1992 FIDESZ abolished its membership age limit, but despite the inclusion 
of older generations the party maintained the political values, strategies and 
organizational forms which differentiated it from SZDSZ. The two parties, both 
coming from anti-communist protest movements, were different from each 
other in their leadership and professionalization dynamics. Within SZDSZ, the 
founders, with their political culture of the “clandestine” and “underground” 
movement were pushed out of the party leadership in favor of professionalized 
types of technocrats who took their place and did not have “catacomb” 
(underground) backgrounds. In FIDESZ, the “Founding Fathers” maintained 
their continuity in the core group of the party leadership (Csizmadia, 1995), and 
they themselves became professional politicians and technocrats. 
The younger generation of movement activists who were never “outlawed” 
for a longer period of time could fit into parliamentary politics; while a 
significant part of the older protest generation, having been persecuted for 
a longer period, left the professionalized political scene behind in order to 
uphold their original creative intellectual professions and roles.
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Sources of internal differentiation and conflict among intra-party groups with 
different values and strategies within the two parties were also based on their 
different strategies and relations towards other social movements. In FIDESZ 
from the beginning there was an internal division between “movementists” 
– the socially-engaged, direct-democracy participation-oriented line – and 
technocrats, who supported professionalization, the market economy and 
representative democracy led by Viktor Orbán, the popular leader of the party. 
The “movementists” tried to maintain direct, “basic” democratic elements 
within the party organization and supported the civil rights activism of social 
movements’ peace and ecology campaigns. This orientation was gradually 
pushed down within FIDESZ through a pragmatic and power-oriented focus, 
and the final fight occurred in 1993 with the victory of the Viktor Orbán-led 
FIDESZ.
The direction of the losers’ “exit” from FIDESZ in 1993 shows the clear-
cut difference between SZDSZ and FIDESZ in their strategies towards social 
movements. At the beginning of the 1990s, Viktor Orbán argued, even on a 
general level, for a “political monopoly” of political parties in parliamentary 
politics and blamed both left and right non-parliamentary movements which 
had competed with political parties on the Hungarian political scene. SZDSZ 
also had its internal debates and leadership conflicts along the “movement 
versus party” front, but in contrast to FIDESZ, even the party’s technocrats 
lost their positions and SZDSZ preserved its openness towards social 
movements and political protest. This led to the fact that during the taxi-driver 
blockade in October 1990, FIDESZ rejected the protest, while the leaders 
of SZDSZ, based on their experience of “resistance” against the communist 
system demanded that the government withdraw in the face of the protest. 
This type of “extra-parliamentary” engagement was preserved in SZDSZ 
and diminished in FIDESZ during the 1990–1994 legislative period (Bozóki 
1992).
FIDESZ, after its strategic and personal reorientation in 1992–1993, 
increasingly became a supporter of the church and nation (Mudde-Kopecky, 
2002; Falk, 2003). FIDESZ grew from an alternative party into a liberal 
one from 1988 to 1992, and from a liberal party to a centre–right, Christian, 
populist one between 1992 and 1998. FIDESZ–MPP changed its membership 
at the European level, and quit the European Convention of Liberal Parties for 
that of the Christian Democrats. Its alliance structure changed: first, FIDESZ 
backed SZDSZ, but after SZDSZ became a member of the governing coalition 
with the Socialists in 1994–1998, FIDESZ found solidarity with the right-wing 
opposition party bloc and sought to build more and more efficient coalitions 
and cooperation with them, using their constituencies in its own interest.
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From FideSZ to FideSZ-mpp: takinG the lead oF 
the Center riGht
At the general elections in 1994, FIDESZ won seven percent of the votes 
cast for party lists and sent twenty representatives to Parliament (Table 1). 
Following the elections, the entire party leadership resigned and they tried to 
analyze the causes of the party’s failure at the elections, which are summarized 
in the document “From Opposition into Opposition”. Orbán was re-elected as 
a party chairman with a solid majority. 
At the local autumn elections, which were changed to a single-round election 
by the governing majority, FIDESZ had several joint candidates with MDF 
and KDNP, taking 284 seats alone and 370 seats with coalition partners. The 
party delegated mayors in seven principal cities (four of them municipalities), 
in three Budapest districts, and in fifteen smaller towns.
At the Seventh Party Congress in late April 1995 (held in Budapest) the 
delegates decided to change the name of the party to the FIDESZ-Hungarian 
Civic Party. They also adopted the slogan “For a Civic Hungary” which stated 
that FIDESZ was a liberal, civic party. The congress elected Orbán as chairman 
for the third consecutive time. Orbán raised the issue of a three-party Civic 
Alliance between FIDESZ, MDF and KDNP because, in his opinion, that 
was the only possibility to create an alternative to the coalition of MSZP and 
SZDSZ which held an overwhelming 72% majority in the Parliament.
Orbán, as chairman of the FIDESZ-Hungarian Civic Party, and Sándor 
Lezsák, chairman of MDF, started negotiations in May regarding cooperation 
between the two parties. The number of FIDESZ parliamentarians increased 
by thirteen people (from the then disbanded KDNP parliamentary group in 
September, and by former MDF MP László Salamon, who joined FIDESZ after 
the 1996 split within MDF). Thus, with a total of 34 MPs, FIDESZ became the 
biggest opposition party in parliament, and was entitled to nominate one of the 
Parliamentary vice-chairmen, selecting János Áder. Zoltán Pokorni was chosen 
as the new leader of the party’s parliamentary group. In October, the National 
Board of the party adopted a resolution calling on FIDESZ to complete an 
agreement with MDF which would allow for successful participation at the 
following year’s general elections. This agreement was signed at the end of the 
year. FIDESZ reached a similar agreement with the organization that had left 
KDNP, the Hungarian Christian Democratic Alliance (MKDSZ), which had 
joint candidates with FIDESZ in individual constituencies as well as candidates 
who had been put on the party lists of FIDESZ. 
At a meeting of the party’s regional leaders in mid-December, Orbán 
declared that the conditions for cooperation between civic political forces had 
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been met and the flagship of this cooperation was FIDESZ. The chairman 
introduced a list of people – many of them experts from outside the party – 
who were responsible for the field of policy. They were largely the people 
who were charged with preparing FIDESZ for government, and those who 
were to become ministers if FIDESZ claimed victory in the elections. 
FideSZ–mpp aS a populiSt  
and mobiliZinG party
The occurrence of political demands formed during the protests in 
Hungary was subject to political changes. The political character of protests 
diminished in the election years of 1990, 1994, and 1998, when political 
issues were highly integrated in these respective campaigns (Körösényi et 
al., 2009). The high level of politicization in 1989 was rooted in the political 
conflicts of the regime change, while the one in 1991-1993 was based on the 
political polarization of pro-government and anti-government initiatives and 
organizations. One of these initiatives, for example, related to the media and 
the question of religious education in schools. 2002–2006 was a peak point 
for protest from the Right which leveled the accusation that parliamentarism 
and constitutionalism were being manipulated by the Left and winning 
the elections was being accomplished through a clandestine conspiracy of 
Communism and Capitalism. 
This type of demand was first raised in 1994 following the rhetoric of the 
electoral campaign, but it did not increase dramatically. At that time, the 
campaigning right-wing parties did not need to extend their campaign to 
include the protest politics of civil society; their approach remained mainly 
within the framework of the electoral campaign. This changed dramatically 
in 2002 when FIDESZ–MPP, parallel to its electoral defeat, opened itself up 
to “citizen’s initiatives” (Citizens’ Circles) from the right, which supported 
its policy of demanding a recount of electoral votes, urging the stepping 
down of the new government and the holding of new elections. In 2002, after 
criticizing the mobilization strategy of SZDSZ against the government in 
2002, FIDESZ–MPP declared its own new mobilization strategy and opened 
itself up to civil society in an attempt to redress its electoral failure.
As we have seen, FIDESZ/FIDESZ–MPP changed a lot of hats in moving 
from being a dissident sub-cultural democratic movement until it became 
the centre–right governing party from 1998 to 2002. Some elements of its 
development were combined speedily and successfully in order to engineer 
its new image and organization under the pressure of the electoral defeat 
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of May 2002 which brought the MSZP–SZDSZ social–liberal coalition 
to power in the summer of 2002 (Table 1). FIDESZ–MPP as a governing 
party within the centre–right coalition acted like a “populist” government; it 
stressed the “national” and the “popular” (Glenn, 2001; Mény-Surel, 2002) 
character of the government coalition and organized government meetings 
in small unknown villages while Viktor Orbán, as a strong Prime Minister, 
behaved as if he had direct links with the masses, acting as a “popular leader”. 
However, having already tasted electoral defeat during the two 2002 election 
turnouts, the situation lead FIDESZ–MPP to become a mobilizing populist 
party that targeted and challenged “them”, the “communists” who came back, 
as they did, by winning at the polls in 2002. As a result, FIDESZ–MPP tried 
to quickly reassert its image as the anti-communist dissent movement, as it 
indeed was from 1988–1990. 
In February 2005, in his annual “state of the nation” speech, Orbán called for 
the year to be centered around “consultation”. A National Consultation Body 
consisting of conservative intellectuals was set up in March; the consultation 
team toured Hungary throughout the whole summer and sent questionnaires 
to every citizen in the country. 
In 2005, the mandate of the President of Hungary ended and – in 
accordance with the Constitution – a new head of state had to be elected by 
the Parliament. The internal problems of the governing parties and tensions 
within the coalition (which had only a ten-seat majority in Parliament) led 
to the victory of the opposition. In the final (third) round of voting, a civic 
candidate, László Sólyom, got the necessary support from FIDESZ MPs and 
in August took office as President of Hungary. On June 11, 2005, Viktor 
Orbán was re-elected as the chairman of the party. 
As the “Civic Governance 2006” program advanced, conferences on 
specific policies were organized from 2005 on. In preparing for the 2006 
elections, the party emphasized its pragmatic profile. Although in 2002 it 
seemed that FIDESZ and MDF would continue with the partnership they 
had been engaged in following the EP elections where the smaller opposition 
party distanced itself from FIDESZ, it was clear that a new strategic ally 
was needed as the election date came closer. Thus FIDESZ opted for a new 
partner: whereas in 2002 it presented its candidates on a joint list with MDF, 
the small party’s hostile attitude toward the leader of the opposition this time 
resulted in a strong bond between FIDESZ and the Hungarian Christian 
Democratic People’s Party (KDNP), with whom a joint list for the coming 
elections was agreed upon. KDNP leader Zsolt Semjén and Viktor Orbán 
signed an agreement on cooperation which meant that, with the exception of 
two individual constituencies where the three opposition parties supported the 
58 MÁTÉ SZABÓ
CORVINUS JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL POLICY  2 (2011) 
same candidate, FIDESZ and KDNP would cooperate effectively, while MDF 
had its separate candidates in every part of the country. 
FIDESZ held its nineteenth congress in March, when Chairman Viktor 
Orbán was unanimously voted to lead the party and was elected candidate for 
prime minister. The official electoral program of FIDESZ was also adopted 
and Orbán announced that the party would host a grand rally on Kossuth 
Square on April 1, a week before the first round of elections. Similarly to the 
event four years earlier, a big crowd gathered in front of the Parliament on the 
“Day of Solidarity” where conservative intellectuals, artists and athletes lined 
up to demonstrate their support for FIDESZ.
In the first round the Socialists lead with 43.21% of votes cast, while 
FIDESZ obtained 42.03%, with MDF passing the 5% threshold by a mere 
0.04% and SZDSZ finishing in third place with 6.5% of votes (Table 1). 
FIDESZ had two weeks to redefine its strategy in order to have the socialist 
government replaced. Talks were initiated with MDF, but the party’s leader, 
Ibolya Dávid, refused to negotiate and to “help Orbán into power”. The leader 
of FIDESZ then made a decision to step down from his candidacy and offered 
the position to Péter Ákos Bod, former President of the Hungarian National 
Bank during the Antall government, who as an economist had worked closely 
with MDF and Ibolya Dávid in previous years and who appeared to represent 
an acceptable compromise for both parties. MDF, however, refused to accept 
the deal and postponed all further negotiations until the second round of 
elections were over. On April 23, it became clear that the socialist-liberal 
government had obtained the necessary majority to stay in office. 
The elements of populism (Mény-Surel 2002) that gained momentum 
within FIDESZ–MPP are as follows:
–  An anti-establishment, anti-elite, anti-“political class”, nomenclature 
orientation;
–  Siding with the people, civil society, national and rural and ethnic 
communities against the “cosmopolitan Social-Liberal parties and their 
allies”;
–  Blaming institutions such as elections and parliamentarism for 
manipulating the “popular will” and emphasizing the need for a review of 
electoral results or even their nullification, and for a repeat of the elections 
of 2002 and 2006;
–  New forms of organizing; for example, building a “Citizens’ Alliance” 
(Polgári Szövetség) with civic society, where national and religious 
symbols play a role, and with efforts directed at cultural and social 
community building to establish hegemony beyond the sphere of politics 
in other social subsystems;
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–  Reshaping the structure of the party to provide momentum to spontaneously 
developed civic initiatives (Citizens’ Circles 2002-2005) on the one hand, 
and dissolving the organizational identities of the centre–right parties 
within a common framework led by FIDESZ–MPSZ on the other.
These elements of populism emerged partly through the recalling of former 
experiences, structures and traditions of anti-communist dissent, or reference 
to Western centre–right party models in Germany (CDU as a Volkspartei) and 
Italy (Forza Italia). This latter development synthesized these elements already 
present within the campaign into the political strategy and organizational 
form at the FIDESZ party conference of May 2003. These organizational 
and strategic changes were exemplified in a new format as the “FIDESZ–
Hungarian Citizens’ Alliance” (FIDESZ–Magyar Polgári Szövetség) of civil 
society, nation and centre–right parties under the strong leadership of Viktor 
Orbán, and based on the governing role played by FIDESZ. In 2006, FIDESZ 
supported a popular right-wing mobilization against the re-elected Socialist–
Liberal government which resulted in violent riots against the leadership of 
the Socialist Party and its Prime Minister, Ferenc Gyurcsány. FIDESZ tried 
to rouse its membership against the potential restitution of communism, and 
competed with the right-wing group “Jobbik” in the extra-parliamentary arena 
and also after the 2010 parliamentary elections. 
aGainSt the SoCialiSt–liberal Government  
and the CruSade aGainSt  
prime miniSter FerenC GyurCSány 
In 2006, massive rioting started after a secret speech, recorded in 
Balatonöszöd, on the manipulation of the electoral program by the re-elected 
Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány was leaked to the public. Rioting escalated 
during the fiftieth anniversary celebrations of the Hungarian Revolution 
of 1956. The political mobilization of FIDESZ in 2002 was not repeated 
during the 2006 electoral campaign. Their civic initiatives were accepted and 
leaders used as volunteer satellite troops of the party during the campaign. 
However, a bigger mobilization with its own distinct character (as in 2002) 
did not take place. FIDESZ lost the elections in 2006 and the Social-Liberal 
coalition won. After the summer holidays, a tape recording of Prime Minister 
Gyurcsány was broadcast to the public on September 18, 2006, which 
contained a hitherto secret speech addressed to the leaders of the Hungarian 
Socialist Party, expressing his uncensored criticism of their own economic 
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policy and electoral program, which was a “lie” in the sense that it could not 
be implemented because of EU restrictions and stability criteria, which held 
that further expansion of indebtedness would not be tolerated.
 The sudden release of the speech resulted in spontaneous mass gatherings 
of approximately 10,000 people in front of the Hungarian Parliament on 
Kossuth Square. The following night some groups of protesters marched to 
the nearby Hungarian state television headquarters and demanded a broadcast 
of a declaration in which they called for the resignation of the government 
and other radical, and basic, changes within Hungarian politics and society. 
The authorities rejected the demand and asked for police intervention to 
remove the protesters from the building. As a result, hundreds and thousands 
of demonstrators from Kossuth Square started a “siege and battle” which 
lasted until morning, resulting in the withdrawal of the police forces which 
were weakened under the pressure of a violent rioting mass, which looted and 
severely damaged the building and broadcasting equipment. 
 Over the following days, confrontations and “battles” between the police 
and unofficial demonstrating groups and individuals continued in the streets 
of Budapest every night. A permanent demonstration at Kossuth Square 
was tolerated until the 23rd of October where the fiftieth anniversary of the 
Hungarian Revolution was celebrated with a wide circle of invited guests 
of the government in the parliament; here police broke up the continuous 
demonstration after more than one month because of security risks. FIDESZ 
supported this permanent demonstration in front of the parliament building 
by sending speakers there almost every day, but rejected street violence and 
illegal demonstrations in accord with other parties in the parliament.
 The dissolution of the permanent demonstration on Kossuth Square resulted 
in a wave of rioting in other places in Budapest on the 23rd of October and 
during the celebrations that followed. The peak point occurred when – parallel 
to and following an official FIDESZ mass gathering in the heart of Budapest 
– thousands of demonstrators fought against the police, built barricades on 
the Pest side of Erzsébet Bridge and later burnt them. Erzsébet Bridge played 
a central role on July 4, 2002, when radical demonstrators blocked traffic for 
hours, protesting against the electoral victory of the Social–Liberal coalition 
and rejecting the result because of alleged manipulation by the Socialists. 
Kossuth Square remained “besieged” by police cordons from October 23, 
2006 to March 17, 2007, when under massive criticism from opposition and 
other liberal voices, the Budapest police declared the place free to be used for 
demonstrations again. Almost the entire FIDESZ parliamentary group – led 
by Viktor Orbán – removed the police fence on February 1, 2007 in part of a 
protest against the illegal violation of human rights.
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The rioting from September 18, 2006 onwards also produced inestimable 
material losses and personal damage. Policemen and demonstrators suffered 
severe injuries and private and public property was damaged, not to mention 
tourism and retail-related losses in Budapest. The loss of prestige for political 
actors and political institutions and the government’s increasing lack of 
legitimacy lead Hungary to lose its image as a peaceful and orderly place for 
investment and tourism in the eyes of global media interested in the expected 
fanfare of the fiftieth anniversary of the Hungarian Revolution, where the 
portrayal of continuous street fighting between authorities and citizens in 
Budapest indicated the opposite scenario. 
The idea of FIDESZ, the hegemony of the right based on one organizational 
form, provoked political discussions with other right-wing parties. However, 
the Hungarian electoral system is of a majoritarian character which helped 
establish the leading role of the right with the hegemony of the FIDESZ–
Citizens’ Alliance, the “Polgári Szövetség”, despite political competition 
from the extreme right party “Jobbik” which was the only real challenger for 
FIDESZ from the right in the 2010 spring parliamentary elections.
reSultS oF the 2010 eleCtion 
The parliamentary elections in Hungary 2010 were held on April 11 and 
April 25, 2010. They are the sixth free elections that have been held since the 
end of the communist era. The 386 members of the Parliament are elected 
using a combined system of party lists and electoral constituencies. In the 
first round of the elections, the rightwing-conservative party FIDESZ won the 
absolute majority of seats, enough to form a government on its own (Table 
3).
In the second round, FIDESZ-KDNP candidates won enough seats 
to achieve the two-thirds majority required to modify major laws and the 
country’s constitution (Table 4).The two biggest parties of the 1989-90 
regime change, the conservative MDF and the liberal SZDSZ, completely 
lost their seats (Table 2). The election campaign was influenced by the high 
unemployment rate – nearly eleven percent in March 2010. The socialist 
MSZP (in a ruling coalition with SZDSZ) was further damaged by a series 
of corruption scandals involving its members and officials. Consequently, 
the opposing FIDESZ-KDNP campaigned under the slogan “The time has 
come!” It promised to create one million jobs over ten years, to boost lending, 
to support small businesses and to cut taxes. Other major contenders included 
the Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik), a right wing party, and Politics 
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Can Be Different (LMP), a green-liberal party founded in February 2009. 
The Jobbik party was founded in 2003 and won nearly fifteen percent of the 
votes in the European Parliament elections in June 2009. Its participation 
in the 2010 elections caused a lot of controversy, as its members used anti-
Roma and anti-Semitic rhetoric and because party leader Gabor Vona argued 
that “Hungary belongs to the Hungarians”. Both FIDESZ-KDNP and MSZP 
rejected the possibility of entering into a coalition with Jobbik.
FIDESZ leader Viktor Orbán became the new prime minister, a position 
he had held from 1998-2002. The 2010 elections ushered in a brand new 
situation in Hungarian politics: the winner was so strong that the smaller 
parties had no chance. FIDESZ won in every category if we look at data 
based on sociological research from the election (gender, places of residence, 
age, educational level, etc.). The reason for the landslide victory was rooted 
partly in the nature and logic of the distribution of seats in the Hungarian 
electoral system, which very much favors the winner, meaning other parties – 
especially smaller ones – are placed at a disadvantageous position, weakening 
them further. The original idea of this model in 1989 was to make a strong 
and stable governing majority possible. But in this case it led to a two-thirds 
majority for the most popular party.
What we may conclude that as a result of reconstructing FIDESZ’s 
development from an anti-Communist protest movement into a successful 
political party over twenty years is that, in Hungary, there has emerged an 
influential governing party of right-wing populist character, combined 
with a tradition of anti-Communist dissent and the new forms of populism 
in Western democracies. Hence FIDESZ will move between populist 
mobilization and crisis management. Populist mobilization supplies its voters 
identified with the “Citizens” (polgárok), but there are the demands of EU, 
NATO and OECD countries, from which Hungary seeks stable membership 
and support. Currently (in 2011), FIDESZ as a governing party has to strike 
a balance between its own populist program, economic and fiscal necessities 
and constraints as well the high expectations the Hungarian population has of 
a government which should solve all of the problems still remaining from the 
transformation to a market economy, liberal democracy and welfare state. This 
“trilemma” (Offe, 1994) is a heavy burden on the dynamics of the mobilizing/
populist party in government. 
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M
P
1990 5.7 8.5 42.8 - - 11.4 24.1 5.4 -
1994 5.1 54.1 9.8 0 - 6.7 17.6 5.7 -
1998 38.1 34.7
with FIDESZ: 
12.5
3.6 - 12.4 6.2 0 -
2002
48.7 (with 
MDF)
46.11
(only with 
FIDESZ)
0 - 0 5.1 0 -
2006 42.0 48.2 2.8 – - 4.6 -
2010
68.1 (with 
KDNP)
15.2 0 – 12.1 0 4.1
Source: National Election Office, www.valasztas.hu
Meaning of party names and acronyms:
FideSZ (FIatal DEmokraták SZövEtSégE, Alliance of Young Democrats), used this acronym at 
the 1990 and 1994 elections. The acronym was changed in 1998 to FideSZ – mpp (FIDESZ–
Magyar Polgári Párt, FIDESZ–Hungarian Citizens’ Party), and at the May 2003 conference the 
acronym FideSZ – mpSZ (FIDESZ–Magyar Polgári Szövetség, FIDESZ –Hungarian Citizens’ 
Alliance) appeared. Within the alliance there are different social and political organizations, 
among them, the Christian Democratic Party (KDNP), which was an autonomous party but now 
is a satellite organization of FIDESZ, despite having a leadership of its own, a faction in the 
parliament and members in the government. At present we may see the Alliance as one political 
unit with organizational differentiation.
FüggEtlEn kISgaZDa éS FölDmunkáS Párt, FkGp, Independent Smallholders’ Party
kErESZtény DEmokrata néPPart, kdnp, Christian Democratic People’s Party 
magyar DEmokrata Fórum, mdF, Hungarian Democratic Forum
magyar IgaZSág éS élEt Pártja, miÉp, Party of Hungarian Life and Truth
magyar SZocIalISta Párt, mSZp, Hungarian Socialist Party 
SZabaD DEmokraták SZövEtSégE, SZdSZ, Alliance of Free Democrats
jobbIk, The Movement for a Better Hungary 
LEhEt máS a PolItIka, LMP, Politics Can Be Different
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Table 2 Results of 2010 elections – 
 Number of Parliamentary Representatives: 386
Parties
In single 
member 
constituency
On regional list On national list Total
Proportion of 
Parliamentary 
mandates
FIDESZ - 
HUNGARIAN 
CIVIC UNION 
KDNP
1 1 0.26%
FIDESZ - 
HUNGARIAN 
CIVIC UNION 
KDNP
167 87 3 262 67.88%
HSP 2 28 29 59 15.28%
Jobbik 
-MOVEMENT 
FOR A BETTER 
HUNGARY
26 21 47 12.18%
LMP -POLITICS 
CAN BE 
DIFFERENT
5 11 16 4.15%
Independent 1 1 0.26%
Total 176 146 64 386 100.00%
Source: National Electional Office, www.valasztas.hu
Table 3
Parties Votes List mandate
Direct 
mandate
Overall 
FIDESZ/KDNP 52.73% 87% 119% 206%
MSZP 19.31% 28% 0% 28%
Jobbik 16.67% 26% 0% 26%
LMP 7.4% 5% 0% 5%
MDF 2.66% 0% 0% 0%
Other 1.17% 0% 0% 0%
Total 100% 146 119 265
1. Table: results in the first round
Source: www. valasztas.hu
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Table 4 In the second round FIDESZ won 54 from 57 constituencies. 
Parties Votes List mandates Direct mandate Overall
FIDESZ/KDNP 3% 54% 57%
MSZP 29% 2% 31%
Jobbik 21% 0% 21%
LMP 11% 0% 11%
MDF 0% 0% 0%
Other 0% 1% 1%
Total 100% 64 57 121
2. Table: Results in the second round
Source: www.valasztas.hu
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